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ABSTRACT 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is the geographic combatant 
command responsible for homeland defense and security.  USNORTHCOM conducts 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) by providing Department of Defense 
(DoD) capabilities from its land, sea and air component in support of lead federal 
agencies in response to homeland security threats.  DoD intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance capabilities have the potential to improve situational and informational 
awareness to the homeland security arena.  Since Hurricane Katrina, these capabilities 
have seen an increase in demand.  Termed Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA), 
these capabilities have been leveraged in response to wildfires in California, hurricanes in 
Texas, and most recently, during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  There are, however, 
significant doctrinal, policy, legal and ethical barriers that impinge on USNORTHCOM’s 
ability to employ these capabilities effectively in the homeland.  This thesis examines 
these barriers, as well as the doctrine and policy disconnects between DoD and the 
emergency management communities.  The author proposes recommendations for 
incorporating IAA into DoD’s Joint Doctrine and the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Response Framework. These recommendations address policy 
barriers, and if implemented, have the potential to turn IAA into an important force 
multiplier for homeland security and emergency management. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is the geographic 
combatant command responsible for homeland defense and security. USNORTHCOM 
conducts Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) by providing Department of 
Defense (DoD) capabilities from its land, sea and air component in support of lead 
federal agencies in response to homeland security threats (U.S. Northern Command, 
2010). 
One unique capability that resides within DoD is the ability to conduct theater-
level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (USAF, 2007, p. 7). This 
capability can provide invaluable situational awareness from multiple intelligence 
disciplines including imagery and signals intelligence for military commanders (USAF, 
2007, p. 19). Improved situational awareness gives commanders the big picture, provides 
a better understanding of problems and allows commanders to apply resources efficiently. 
Although theater ISR capabilities were designed to support kinetic effects on battlefields, 
ISR imaging capabilities have been used to support humanitarian operations and civil 
authorities during natural disasters. USNORTHCOM employed limited theater ISR 
capabilities to provide imagery and full-motion video of hurricanes Katrina (Haulman, 
2006) and Ike (USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, 2008). United States Southern Command 
used imagery and full-motion-video to support initial relief efforts in Haiti (AF ISR 
Agency Public Affairs, 2010). Theater ISR platforms employing electro-optical and 
synthetic aperture imaging systems have the potential to increase the effectiveness of 
response significantly in homeland security incidents by providing incident commanders 
and first responders the same level of situational awareness enjoyed by battlefield 
commanders. There are, however, significant obstacles to realizing theater ISR’s full 
potential for homeland security. Currently, doctrine, policy, statutory and ethical 
impediments exist that prevent theater ISR from reaching its full potential for homeland 
security.  
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The first impediment is doctrine. USNORTHCOM provides DoD capabilities to a 
lead federal agency by marrying the Joint Doctrine to the National Response Framework 
(NRF). In other words, the same doctrine that DoD uses to fight wars is used to support 
civil authorities. While DoD is indisputably the most effective military force in the world, 
its doctrine is geared toward employing military force to destroy an enemy. Given 
enough time, this same doctrine can provide considerable resources to a homeland 
security incident. Unfortunately, the process for generating and apportioning forces is 
cumbersome and relatively slow. The doctrine is sound, but it is not responsive enough to 
be useful for some of the immediate consequence management needs in homeland 
security.  
Domestic intelligence activities came under intense scrutiny and were severely 
restricted after the Vietnam conflict and Watergate scandal (Senate, 1976, pp. 8–11). 
Executive Order (EO) 12333 (The President U. S., 1981) and the subsequent amendments 
found in EO 13470 (The President U. S., 2008) define permissible activities by members 
of the intelligence community when conducting intelligence activities in the United 
States. They also prohibit DoD from collecting information on U.S. citizens. Although 
EO 13470 revised EO 12333 for the post-9/11 environment, it did not address the use of 
intelligence resources for domestic homeland security responses, which continues to 
restrict the employment of theater-ISR significantly in the United States (The President 
U. S., 2008). In addition, legal restrictions, such as the Posse Comitatus Act (U.S. 
Congress, 1878) and the Insurrection Act (U.S. Congress, 1807), restrict DoD’s authority 
to act within the United States and often increases the time it takes to deliver military 
capability to an incident. 
Finally, legal and ethical issues can impede the use of theater ISR in homeland 
security. Domestic intelligence collection and privacy concerns go hand in hand. Prior to 
the 2008 presidential inauguration, the Los Angeles Times reported that Navy 
reconnaissance aircraft would fly above the Mall to collect information on crowds 
(Meyer, 2009). The ensuing backlash of negative press put General Victor Renuart, then 
commander of USNORTHCOM, on the defensive and demonstrated the public’s distrust. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary aim of this research is to determine how DoD, theater-level 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets can be effectively used for homeland 
security and defense. To support the author’s research, the following secondary questions 
are explored.  
• What are the doctrinal, institutional and organizational barriers that must 
be overcome for DoD ISR assets to be used effectively for homeland 
security?  
• What are the policy barriers that must be overcome for DoD ISR assets to 
be used effectively for homeland security?  
• What are the legal barriers that must be overcome for DoD ISR assets to 
be used effectively for homeland security?  
• What are the ethical barriers that must be overcome for DoD ISR assets to 
be used effectively for homeland security? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
This thesis contributes to DSCA by identifying shortcomings in current policy 
and offering proposed improvements. The desired outcome of the research is to propose 
and incorporate changes to the Joint Doctrine that enables USNORTHCOM to proved 
timely and flexible IAA in support of homeland security. Improved doctrine will improve 
DoD’s ability to deliver IAA capabilities to federal, state, local, and tribal entities, and in 
some cases, private sector entities engage in homeland security responses. Consumers 
across the spectrum from key decision makers in the White House to first responders on 
scene will benefit from improved delivery of IAA capabilities. The author is employed as 
an intelligence officer in the air component of USNORTHCOM and will be able to 
submit the proposals for consideration during the joint doctrine revision cycle. 
Acceptance of this research in operational doctrine should allow DoD to streamline its 
ability to deliver IAA to the emergency management community and increase the 
effectiveness of DoD’s support to civil authorities in the homeland security arena. 
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D. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The idea of utilizing DoD airborne ISR platforms to provide domestic imagery 
and full-motion video in support of natural disasters and homeland security events is 
relatively new. Hurricane Katrina and subsequent lessons learned provided the impetus 
for the military to find ways to support civil authorities in every way possible when asked 
to do so. Since this discipline is less than five years old, the available literature is limited 
and narrowly focused. It can be divided into four categories: national strategy and 
doctrine, law and regulatory guidance, concepts of operation and employment, and 
scholarly articles. 
1. National Strategy and Doctrine 
Extensive work has been done at all levels of government to establish protocols 
for disaster and emergency response within the United States. The Department of 
Homeland Security created the NRF and the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) that delineates responsibilities and defines processes for state and local 
governments, as well as non-government organizations to integrate federal assistance to 
all-hazard responses (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. i). 
In addition, a robust set of military doctrine exists that covers nearly every aspect 
of military operations. Joint Publication 3-0; Joint Operations provides the foundation 
for conducting the full-spectrum of military operations while Joint Publication 2-0; Joint 
Intelligence provides guidance for employing intelligence in support of these operations. 
While documents stress the importance of unity of command and the concept of 
centralized command and control with decentralized execution through the full spectrum 
of military operations (CJCS, 2006, pp. II–11), neither specifically addresses domestic 
operations in support of civil authorities. Joint Publication 3-2; Civil Support provides 
authoritative guidance for integrating the Joint Doctrine with the NRF and the NIMS 
(CJCS, 2007, p. viii). This 153-page document dedicates one paragraph in 
acknowledgement that ISR assets may be used in the civil support mission but should 
only be used as a last resort when state and local capabilities are exhausted and may be 
subject to legal and regulatory restrictions (CJCS, 2007, pp. III–9). Like Joint Publication 
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2-0; Joint Intelligence, the Air Force Doctrine Document 2-9: Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Operations focuses on full-spectrum warfare and kinetic effects. 
The focus of the document can be summed up by the quote on the cover, “intelligence is 
targeting and targeting is intelligence” (USAF, 2007, p. Title Page). 
2. Laws and Regulatory Guidance 
Extensive legal and regulatory guidance exists with regard to the use of the 
military and the conduct of intelligence activities for domestic purposes. Much of this 
guidance, like the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of the military as a 
domestic police force (U.S. Congress, 1878), and EO 12333, which limits domestic 
intelligence activities by the national intelligence community (The President U.S., 1981), 
serve to protect civil liberties and restrict the power of the federal government. The 
Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book provides an authoritative compilation of 
legal and regulatory guidance to assist intelligence professionals in executing their duties. 
None of this guidance specifically addresses the use of intelligence assets to support 
domestic operations in support of civil authorities. The preponderance of the body of 
laws and regulations were written prior to the two watershed events that define current 
homeland security issues: 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.  
3. Concepts of Operation and Employment 
The bulk of the literature that exists on the topic of utilizing ISR for homeland 
defense exists in this category. United States Northern Command’s air component, Air 
Forces Northern (AFNORTH) and the National Guard Bureau jointly developed an 
Incident Awareness and Assessment Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) that gives a brief 
overview of active duty and National Guard capabilities and processes for responding to 
homeland security contingencies with unity of effort in mind (Air Forces Northern, 
2009). The IAA CONPOS recently evolved into the AFNORTH IAA Playbook, which 
attempts to characterize concisely the ISR capabilities that DoD brings to DSCA, their 
method of employment and the estimated cost of their use (Air Forces Northern, 2010).  
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AFNORTH also developed the DSCA Air Support Handbook, which identifies full-
spectrum air component capabilities (including ISR assets) that can be requested through 
the NRF to support civil authorities.  
The Department of Homeland Security has also developed a CONOPS and a 
concept of employment (CONEMP) for its Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination 
Cell (IRSCC). These documents outline DHS’s plans to posture the IRSCC as the focal 
point for imagery and full-motion video support to the NRF during all-hazard homeland 
defense contingencies. 
These conceptual plans were developed in the post-Katrina environment and have 
not been fully tested or operationalized. 
4. Scholarly Articles 
Few scholarly articles exist on this particular subject. In fact, only two articles can 
be readily found. The first is a scholarly paper, “ISR Support to Humanitarian Relief 
Operations within the United States: Where Everyone is in Charge,” which was written 
for the Naval War College specifically to address identified shortfalls in the response to 
Hurricane Katrina.  The author, Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer Sovada, United States Air 
Force, was detailed to AFNORTH as a collection manager in support of DoD efforts to 
assist civil authorities with ISR support in response to Hurricane Katrina. Sovada 
identified the lack unity of command and synchronization of effort within 
USNORTHCOM and its interagency partners as a factor that prevented the effective 
delivery of ISR support to humanitarian operations within the United States (Sovada, 
2008, p. iii).  
The other scholarly article, “The U.S. Air Force Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 
is a statistical recapitulation of the United States Air Force’s efforts to support civil 
authorities in response to Hurricane Katrina (Haulman, 2006).  
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5. General Analysis 
The concept of using ISR assets to provide imagery and full-motion video to 
support decision makers and first responders during homeland security events is fewer 
than five years old. As a result, very little literature on the subject exists.  
The preponderance of the literature found in national strategy and doctrine, as 
well as legal and regulatory guidance, does not specifically address this topic. Literature 
in the national strategy and doctrine category addresses defense support to civil 
authorities, and recognizes the usefulness of intelligence capabilities, but a significant 
gap exists in doctrine and strategy when it comes to employing intelligence assets to 
support civil authorities.  
Legal and regulatory guidelines establish domestic constraints on the use of 
federal forces and the national intelligence community and serve to protect civil liberties. 
While the body of literature does not envision the use of intelligence assets in a homeland 
security role in support authorities, it does place significant restrictions on the use of 
these assets.  
Most of the literature directly pertaining to the subject exists as CONOPS and 
CONEMPS produced by DoD and DHS. AFNORTH, the National Guard Bureau and 
DHS, have shouldered most of the burden of developing operational strategies for 
employing ISR assets in support of homeland security events. However, these are 
conceptual plans that have not been fully tested, operationalized or recognized in national 
strategy and doctrine. 
The area most lacking is scholarly articles. Only two scholarly articles are readily 
found on this subject. The first is extremely salient and identifies unity of command and 
effort as the keys to employing ISR assets successfully in support of domestic 
humanitarian operations. The other article is a historical document that captures the 
United States Air Force’s quantitative ISR efforts in support of Hurricane Katrina relief. 
As a whole, the body of literature on this subject shows a deficiency in formalized 
doctrine, legal policy and scholarly analysis. 
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E. HYPOTHESES  
Using DoD ISR assets for IAA to support homeland security faces significant 
barriers, which manifest themselves in the form of legal, policy, institutional and 
organizational issues that stand in the way of realizing the full potential of ISR support 
for domestic operations.  
Law and policy places limits on the use of the military and the intelligence 
community in domestic matters. The Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act 
prohibit the military from acting in a law enforcement capacity in the United States (U.S. 
Congress, 1878) unless civil authority has broken down and is unable to function (U.S. 
Congress, 1807). Using DoD intelligence assets to support law enforcement, even in with 
the best of intentions, presents ample opportunity to run afoul of the law. Intelligence 
oversight policy for the executive branch is addressed in EO 12333. This order places 
limits on the domestic activities of the national intelligence community (U.S. The 
President, 1981) and makes senior leaders hesitant to traverse this legal minefield without 
an army of lawyers and legal safeguards, which hampers timely response.  
While the Joint Doctrine recognized the importance of intelligence and situational 
awareness to operations, it failed to recognize IAA as a doctrinal mission set (Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). As a term of art, IAA has been in use since Hurricane 
Katrina. It is widely accepted in USNORTHCOM and DHS but it has yet to make it into 
the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the lexicon of Joint Doctrine 
(Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff). Without recognition in Joint Doctrine, IAA will not 
receive the resources and effort required from the Joint Staff and force providers required 
for USNORTHCOM to perform its DSCA mission. 
Organizational and institutional barriers stand in the way of unity of effort. There 
are multiple jurisdictions with competing priorities and missions in every major 
homeland security event. Joint Publication 3-0 describes unity of effort as the key to 
successful operations involving interagency partners (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2006, p. ix). In joint military operations, a Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB) 
would meet to prioritize collection requirements and apportion ISR assets to the 
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requirements (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. I–11). The JCMB derives its 
authority from the Joint Force Commander under the concept of unity of command. In 
the multi-jurisdictional federalist system, it is unlikely that unity of command will ever be 
achieved. Thus, the Department of Homeland Security stood up the IRSCC as a JCMB-
like interagency body to provide unity of effort for imagery collection in support of 
homeland security (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 52). Unfortunately, the 
IRSCC is an ad hoc organization that stands up only when needed, is unproven and lacks 
clout. 
This thesis examines the impact that these obstacles have on DoD’s ability to 
provide IAA capabilities for homeland security. It analyzes current emergency 
management policy, relevant DoD doctrine, as well as the policies, laws and ethical 
issues surrounding the employment of IAA for domestic operations.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
DoD has a robust ISR capability and a demonstrated ability to employ it overseas. 
Effective employment of IAA in the United States is not a matter of if it can be done; 
instead, it is a matter of overcoming policy, legal and ethical barriers. This research is 
conducted in three parts. The first part employs a policy analysis of existing doctrine 
combined with case studies of recent historical events to identify ways in which IAA can 
be used to support homeland security. The second part of the research uses policy 
analysis to identify shortfalls in current doctrine that prevent the effective employment 
IAA in the homeland security arena. The final part of the research utilizes policy analysis 
to identify legal and regulatory barriers. This methodology is also used to identify 
recommendations to improve current policies. 
By conducting a policy analysis of the NRF, areas where IAA can be effectively 
used in support of homeland security Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are 
identified. Additionally, case studies of historical lessons learned are reviewed to 
determine under what additional circumstances IAA can be used to increase the 
effectiveness of homeland security response. Specifically, the research examines 
Hurricane Katrina, the California Wildfires of 2007, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 
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(recent DoD earthquake relief efforts in Haiti) and Deepwater Horizon response efforts in 
the Gulf of Mexico. These cases were selected because they represent diverse homeland 
security problem sets. Each case demonstrates a need for IAA, and as a whole, they 
represent progressive attempts to integrate IAA into the response.  
Once the areas where IAA can be used are identified, the second part of the 
research involves a policy analysis to review the Joint Doctrine; specifically, the relevant 
portions of Joint Publications 2-0 Joint Intelligence, 3-0, Joint Operations, and 3-28 
Civil Support. This review identifies gaps in existing policies that prevent or impede DoD 
from effectively providing IAA support to the needs identified during the first part of the 
research. In addition, legal and regulatory guidance is reviewed to determine if 
impediments to current policy exist that may prevent meeting the needs identified during 
the first step of the research. Specifically, the Posse Comitatus Act, and EO 12333 (as 
amended) are examined.  
After defining existing policy shortfalls, recommendations for policy changes are 
offered that address the shortfalls identified during the initial part of the research. 
Although current policy is not optimized for the homeland security environment, it is 
based on sound theories and principles for use in theaters of operations outside the 
continental United States. As such, it is expected that current policy will serve as a 
foundation from which more effective policies can be derived. 
As the DoD geographic combatant command for North America, 
USNORTHCOM is charged with both homeland security and homeland defense 
missions. It has the ability to bring significant capabilities and resources from the military 
services to any homeland security problem to support civil authorities. One of these 
capabilities is the ability to use airborne intelligence systems capable of surveying broad 
areas or providing near-real time full-motion video of an area from the platform to the 
consumer. These capabilities can potentially answer time-critical information 
requirements for incident commanders and responders alike. High levels of situational 
awareness can assist in directing precious resources and capabilities quickly and 
effectively to mitigate loss of life, human suffering and property damage. While DoD has 
a proven track record of using these capabilities in fighting wars, there have been 
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significant obstacles to achieving equal success in the homeland security arena. DoD 
operates using the fundamental principles that guide U.S. forces in coordinated action 
toward a common goal (Chariman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, p. 193), while all levels of 
civilian government operates on the NIMS and the NRF when conducting emergency 
management. As a result, serious disconnects exist between DoD and the interagency 
when DoD attempts to support civil authorities. Also, legal and ethical issues restrict 
DoD’s ability to use these intelligence capabilities domestically, even when used for 
benign purposes.  
As mentioned earlier, the NIMS and the NRF are the keystone documents used by 
all levels of government in the United States for emergency management. The policy 
analysis begins by examining these two key documents to determine what types of 
situational awareness information are needed for homeland security and determine where 
IAA can help to satisfy these requirements. 
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II.  ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
FOR INCIDENT AWARENESS AND ASSESSMENT 
A. THE NIMS AND THE NRF 
The NIMS and the NRF are complementary strategies that represent the national 
doctrine of emergency management. The NIMS repeatedly emphasizes the importance of 
intelligence and information as situational awareness tools for managing emergencies. In 
fact, the NIMS specifically mentions geospatial data as a form of intelligence that can 
satisfy these intelligence and information requirements within the Incident Command 
System (ICS) (Department of Homeland Security, December 2008, p. 28).  
The analysis and sharing of information and intelligence are important 
elements of ICS. In this context, intelligence includes not only national 
security or other types of classified information but also other operational 
information, such as risk assessments, medical intelligence (i.e., 
surveillance), weather information, geospatial data, structural designs, 
toxic contaminant levels, and utilities and public works data that may 
come from a variety of different sources. (Department of Homeland 
Security, December 2008, p. 59) 
The NIMS also discusses the importance of interoperable communications for emergency 
management. While the NIMS recognizes that each agency has unique communications 
requirements specific to its discipline or specialty, it underscores the importance of being 
able to communicate in plain language or common terms during emergencies when 
working within the ICS structure. Although the plain language issue is usually examined 
in the frame of tactical radio communications, it should be noted that interagency partners 
and stakeholders should easily understand operational plans as well (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008, pp. 26–30). DoD has a well-earned reputation for using 
acronyms and complex terminology unique to the military. The Joint Doctrine is no 
exception and this may be an impediment for the successful employment of IAA for 




The NRF contains five key principles. 
• Engaged partnership 
• Tiered response 
• Scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities 
• Unity of effort through unified command 
• Readiness to act (Department of Homeland Security, January 2008, p. 14) 
The NRF builds upon the NIMS by defining emergency management tasks into 
15 ESFs and breaking down the associated tasks by enumerating the scope of each 
function. All of the ESFs have inherent information requirements, many of which can be 
satisfied by IAA. These requirements are detailed in the scope of the ESF. After a 
disaster, it is imperative for emergency managers and first responders to understand the 
impacts on the respective support functions in order of plan and execute recovery 
operations ESF #1, Transportation is a good example. In the ESF #1 example, 
transportation information requirements include the status of transportation infrastructure, 
damage assessment and associated movement restrictions (Department of Homeland 
Security, January 2008, pp. 57–59). DoD IAA capabilities can easily satisfy these 
information requirements using broad area coverage, the basic ability to survey large 
areas using optical, infrared or radar imaging techniques, or full-motion video, and a 
near-real time live video feed that can be transmitted from the mission aircraft to a 
ground station for immediate consumption. An examination of the scope of each of the 
15 ESFs illustrates the areas where IAA capabilities can assist. Table 1 lists each of the 
15 ESFs and their associated scope. The information requirements listed in the “scope” 







Table 1.   Emergency Support Functions and Associated Scope (From Department of 
Homeland Security, January 2008, pp. 57–59)  
ESF Scope 
ESF #1–Transportation 
Aviation/airspace management and control  
Transportation safety  
Restoration/recovery of transportation 
infrastructure  
Movement restrictions  
Damage and impact assessment  
ESF #2–Communications 
Coordination with telecommunications and 
information technology industries  
Restoration and repair of 
telecommunications infrastructure  
Protection, restoration, and sustainment of 
national cyber and information 
technology resources  
Oversight of communications within the Federal 
incident management and response 
structures  
ESF #3–Public Works and 
Engineering 
Infrastructure protection and emergency 
repair  
Infrastructure restoration  
Engineering services and construction 
management  
Emergency contracting support for life-saving 
and life-sustaining services  
ESF #4–Firefighting 
Coordination of Federal firefighting activities 
Support to wildland, rural, and urban 
firefighting operations  
ESF #5–Emergency Management 
Coordination of incident management and 
response efforts  
Issuance of mission assignments  
Resource and human capital  
Incident action planning  
Financial management  
ESF #6–Mass Care, Emergency 
Assistance, Housing, and Human 
Services 
Mass care  
Emergency assistance  
Disaster housing  
Human services  
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ESF Scope 
ESF #7–Logistics Management and 
Resource Support 
Comprehensive, national incident logistics 
planning, management, and sustainment 
capability  
Resource support (facility space, office 
equipment and supplies, contracting 
services, etc.)  
ESF #8–Public Health and Medical 
Services 
Public health  
Medical  
Mental health services  
Mass fatality management  
ESF #9–Search and Rescue Life-saving assistance  Search and rescue operations  
ESF #10–Oil and Hazardous 
Materials Response 
Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, 
biological, radiological, etc.) response  
Environmental short- and long-term cleanup  
ESF #11–Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
Nutrition assistance  
Animal and plant disease and pest response  
Food safety and security  
Natural and cultural resources and historic 
properties protection and restoration  
Safety and well-being of household pets  
ESF #12–Energy 
Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, 
and restoration  
Energy industry utilities coordination  
Energy forecast  
ESF #13–Public Safety and Security
Facility and resource security  
Security planning and technical resource 
assistance  
Public safety and security support  
Support to access, traffic, and crowd control  
ESF #14–Long-Term Community 
Recovery 
Social and economic community impact 
assessment  
Long-term community recovery assistance to 
States, local governments, and the private 
sector  




ESF #15–External Affairs 
Emergency public information and protective 
action guidance  
Media and community relations  
Congressional and international affairs  
Tribal and insular affairs  
B. HURRICANE KATRINA 
On August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina bore down on the Gulf Coast, unleashing 
the brunt of its devastation on the coastal areas of Louisiana and Mississippi. The levees 
that protected New Orleans from the waters of Lake Pontchartrain failed and the city 
quickly found itself under water. The massive devastation inflicted by this storm was a 
watershed event in emergency management that thrust DoD and USNORTHCOM into 
assisting civil authorities on an unprecedented scale. Citizens were trapped in their homes 
by the rising water, roads were blocked and crime skyrocketed. Local authorities were 
overwhelmed, civil order broke down and chaos ensued. National news networks 
frequently displayed aerial photos of residents sitting on their rooftops seeking refuge 
from the rising flood waters and waiting to be rescued by authorities. After a few days, 
the operation turned from rescue to recovery. The challenges that faced policy makers, 
emergency managers and first responders alike throughout the spectrum of operations 
consisted of finding people in need of rescue or recovery, getting to those people and 
assessing the roads and infrastructure that allowed it. Achieving unity of effort from 
disparate agencies proved to be a key challenge for interagency participants, particularly 
from DoD, where unity of command and who is in charge is an essential tenant of 
military doctrine (Sovada, 2008, pp. 1–2). It was apparent to the nation that DoD, DHS 
and the National Guard were not successful in synchronizing their lines of effort. It was 
as if they were all in the same boat, paddling in different directions while the residents of 
the Gulf Coast waited and suffered. 
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C. DEEPWATER HORIZON 
In 2010, a methane bubble sparked a deadly explosion on British Petroleum’s 
offshore oil platform, Deepwater Horizon. The explosion caused the immediate deaths of 
11 people, a large fire and the worst oil pollution disaster in history (James, 2010). More 
than 205 million gallons of raw crude oil are estimated to have gushed into the Gulf of 
Mexico (Hoch, 2010). A significant amount of this oil made its way onto the shores of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. The mission involved identifying and 
containing resulting oil slicks and mitigating environmental damage to the shoreline 
while engineers worked to cap the well head located more than 5,000 feet below the 
surface. The information requirements for this effort consisted of accurate locational data 
about the oil slicks to move skimmer vessels and dispersant flights into position to 
combat the slick. These efforts generated an extensive need for IAA capabilities, 
particularly full-motion video and near-real time locational data for the oil slicks. Since 
skimmer vessels typically travel at speeds less than 10 knots, precise locational data was 
critical before committing the skimmers to areas where slicks were expected to be found. 
Although Deepwater Horizon crossed several of the ESF disciplines, remote sensing and 
IAA capabilities proved critical. The Deepwater Horizon National Incident Commander, 
Admiral Thad Allen told Major General Garry Dean, Commander of Air Forces 
Northern–the air component of USNORTHCOM, that remote sensing and IAA functions 
were so critical that a separate and distinct ESF for remote sensing would have facilitated 
a more timely and efficient response (Dean, 2010). Admiral Allen indicated that industry, 
the Coast Guard and interagency partners were heavily dependent on the NIMS/NRF 
incident command structure yet DoD was not. Additionally IAA and remote sensing 
functions are not currently aligned with the NIMS or the NRF, which posed significant 
organizational challenges to a timely and effective response. Admiral Allen pointed out 
that the current emergency response structure was essentially two-dimensional and that 




Clearly, a need exists for an organized and structured approach to remote sensing 
in the homeland security arena. Remote sensing can provide valuable information for 
emergency managers and first responders alike. DoD IAA assets are uniquely suited to 
this role because they can provide both broad area coverage and full-motion video that 
can offer rapid damage and infrastructure assessments, find people in need of rescue and 
assist in committing scarce emergency management resources to the places where they 
will do the most good.  
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III.  ANALYSIS OF DOD DOCTRINE, POLICY, LAWS AND 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO ISR AND IAA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
USNORTHCOM’s ability to provide support to civil authorities, particularly the 
ability to deliver ISR capabilities for IAA, is constrained by doctrine, policy and laws, as 
well as ethical considerations. Doctrine, the collective guidance that DoD uses to plan 
and execute operations, is focused on fighting wars and little of it has been dedicated to 
the civil support role. Policy, in the form of executive orders and DoD regulations, serves 
to limit the authority of the military to operate in the homeland, and in doing so, places 
significant restrictions on the manner in which USNORTHCOM can provide support to 
civil authorities. Legislation, specifically the Posse Comitatus Act and Insurrection Act, 
provide narrow guidelines that further regulate how the DoD may operate within the 
United Sates. Finally, privacy concerns pose ethical barriers that must be considered 
when using America’s intelligence apparatus in a homeland security role, even when 
used with the most altruistic intentions. An examination of these factors will show that 
while significant, the policy, legal and ethical challenges are not insurmountable. The 
most significant challenges actually lie in the doctrine that DoD uses to deliver its 
capabilities. 
B. JOINT DOCTRINE 
The Joint Doctrine is the compilation of the current state of knowledge and 
wisdom in planning and conducting military operations and is considered authoritative. 
The military services use doctrine as the standard to which they must organize, train and 
equip their forces to provide a ready pool of trained people and capabilities to meet the 
needs of combatant commanders (Chariman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, p. 193). It is also 
the standard by which geographic combatant commands (like USNORTHCOM) employ 
those forces provided by the services and conduct operations (Chariman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2009, p. 193). 
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Joint Doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide the employment of 
U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. 
Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires judgment in 
application. (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) 
The Joint Doctrine encompasses many volumes of information, but a handful of 
these are applicable to any undertaking in which DoD becomes involved. Joint 
Publications 2-0: Joint Intelligence and 3-0: Joint Operations are integral to any military 
operation because they represent DoD’s fundamental organizational toolbox. In addition, 
Joint Publication 3-28: Civil Support is a key doctrine document for homeland security 
operations. The services also develop doctrine, procedures and concepts of operations to 
support joint operations. Unfortunately, the preponderance of this doctrine is built upon 
the DoD’s wartime mission to conduct offensive and defensive operations against a 
foreign military force (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, pp. x–xxv). This is true in 
regard to the preponderance of doctrine for conducting ISR operations as well. In fact, the 
most succinct illustration of this is stated on the cover of selected copies of Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2-9: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations with 
the statement, “intelligence is targeting and targeting is intelligence.” In addition, the 
term targeting is used 98 times in the 74-page document (USAF, 2007, pp. 1–74). In 
other words, the armed forces developed a remote sensing capability through their ISR 
enterprise to develop the target intelligence necessary to apply force effectively to U.S. 
enemies and assess whether or not that force creates the desired effect by its application. 
C. JOINT PUBLICATION 2-0: JOINT INTELLIGENCE 
Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence (JP-2-0) is the keystone publication and 
provides “a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint intelligence 
operations in cooperation with our multinational partners, other U.S. Government 
agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations” (Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007). It provides a primer on the national intelligence community and its 
various disciplines, addresses the principles of joint intelligence, discusses intelligence 
support to the processes of planning, executing and assessing military operations and then 
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delves into joint, interagency and multi-national cooperation. This publication recognizes 
the importance of such key concepts as unity of effort, information sharing and 
cooperation between military, coalition, federal, state and local interagency partners, and 
non-government organizations. The bulk of the publication focuses on intelligence 
preparation of the environment to leverage knowledge and information superiority as a 
force multiplier to joint operations. There is a cursory acknowledgement of the possibility 
that intelligence may be necessary for domestic operations (Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2007, pp. i–iv). 
The Secretary of Defense may use his authorities to permit U.S. Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) to use its intelligence capabilities, and the 
Joint Intelligence Operations Center - North may task Department of 
Defense (DoD) intelligence components, to provide support to 
USNORTHCOM missions other than foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence in continental United States (CONUS) special 
missions. (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
While this acknowledgement discusses the possibility of using ISR assets to 
support civil authorities, it does not recognize IAA as a formal mission set or codify it in 
doctrine. It also does not delve into the legal issues that must be satisfied prior to 
conducting IAA save for the one statement that indicates that the authority to authorize 
such missions rests with the Secretary of Defense.  
Like most military publications, JP-2-0 is steeped in acronyms and military jargon 
that is not readily understood by those outside the military community. This presents 
potential impediments to timely IAA assistance from DoD to the interagency, which 
looks to the NIMS, and specifically the NRF, to understand what capabilities are 
available when dealing with homeland security problem sets. Since DoD’s capabilities 
are primarily defined in the Joint Doctrine, it can be very difficult for an emergency 
manager, under the pressure of an actual or impending disaster, to research and 
understand easily the capabilities that DoD can offer. 
 24
D. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0: JOINT OPERATIONS 
Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (JP 3-0) serves as the keystone document 
“that forms the very core of joint doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ 
ability to fight as a joint team.” (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006) The remainder of 
the publications that comprises the Joint Doctrine serves as enablers to this single 
unifying document, which contains a primer on joint operations and joint organization. It 
describes the role of the geographic combatant commanders as warfighters and the role of 
the services to organize, train and equip forces apportioned on an as-needed basis to the 
combatant commanders. It continues to describe the joint functions and a phased 
approach to operations for planning, execution and assessment (CJCS, 2006, pp. x–xxv). 
Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, the 
overarching constructs and principles contained in this publication provide 
a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint operations in 
cooperation with our multinational partners, other U.S. Government 
agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. 
(Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006) 
JP 3-0 emphasizes the importance of the concept of unity of command in any 
military operation, but concedes that there are cases, particularly within the interagency, 
in which unity of command may be impossible to obtain. In these instances, the Joint 
Doctrine emphasizes the imperative of unity of effort (CJCS, 2006, p. A2). This is 
particularly applicable in the homeland security arena in which DoD operates in support 
of a lead federal agency that is, in turn, supporting a state or local government.  
Although brief, the section on the intelligence core function recognizes the 
fundamental importance of understanding the operational environment and the necessity 
of good intelligence to satisfy this requirement. JP 3-0 states that surveillance and 
reconnaissance are necessary for satisfying information requirement across the spectrum 
of military operations (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, pp. III 16–17). 
Like JP 2-0, JP 3-0 recognizes that military operations may include domestic 
operations (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, p. III 21) that support homeland 
security, but is primarily focused on offensive and defensive military operation against 
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foreign adversaries. JP 3-0, the keystone document for planning and conducting joint 
military operations fails to even conceive of the concept of using ISR assets to support 
homeland security. Additionally, like the rest of the Joint Doctrine, JP 3-0 is written for 
military professionals and is filled with DoD-specific terminology that includes a 29-page 
glossary of acronyms and definitions (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, pp. GL 1–
29). This may pose an impediment to interagency partners in the homeland security.  
E. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-28: CIVIL SUPPORT 
Joint Publication 3-28: Civil Support represents specific DoD doctrine for 
supporting civil authorities, conducting domestic operations and participating in 
consequence management (CJCS, 2007, p. i). This publication describes the Framework, 
the Operational Environment and Operations likely to be conducted by DoD in support of 
civil authorities (CJCS, 2007, pp. vii–x). 
The Framework section discusses the relationship between DoD and civil 
authorities when conducting civil support missions. When describing the civil support 
framework, JP 3-28 references the National Response Plan (NRP) (CJCS, 2007, p. v). 
The NRP was replaced and superseded by the NRF shortly after the publication of JP 3-
28 in September 2007. While dated, it is not entirely irrelevant as the NRF is essentially a 
more flexible evolution of the NRP. 
The Civil Support Operational Environment section discusses the authorities 
under which DoD operates to support a lead federal agency and the process by which a 
request for assistance is validated and turned into a mission assignment. It outlines the 
roles and responsibilities of DoD organizations, the National Guard and key federal 
agencies engaged in the homeland security enterprise. This section also emphasizes the 
importance of the information environment and information sharing as a key enabler of 
civil support operations (CJCS, 2006, pp. II 1–26). 
The section on Operations provides a discussion of the spectrum of missions that 
are DoD is likely to be asked to accomplish in its DSCA role. It also provides a tailored, 
phased approach to operations similar to the phases of joint military operations described 
in JP 3-0 (CJCS, 2006, pp. III 1–14). Intelligence is discussed throughout the document 
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and, specifically, in the mission descriptions of this section. JP 3-28 delves into a 
formidable level of detail and rightly separates intelligence activities by applying the 
legal authorities given to the 16 members of the national intelligence community as 
activities involving the conduct of either Foreign Intelligence (FI) or Counterintelligence 
(CI). It further discusses particular activities in which intelligence personnel and 
resources are used for purposes that fall into neither of these categories. IAA is neither FI 
nor CI and falls into this category (CJCS, 2006, p. IV 13). 
While this is the most comprehensive DoD doctrine regarding DSCA, it falls 
short in several areas. It does recognize the need for information and intelligence as a key 
enabler for consequence management, as well as the possibility that DoD ISR assets 
could be used to satisfy these requirements in the form of what it calls Aerial Damage 
Assessment, but places barriers to its employment, which are not in synch with the 
requirements and demand for this specialized capability as demonstrated in events like 
Hurricane Katrina, the California Wildfires of 2007 and Deepwater Horizon. JP 3-28 
appears to discourage the use of DoD ISR assets for IAA purposes and falls short of 
formalizing IAA as a DSCA mission set.  
Aerial Damage Assessment—Aerial damage assessment (ADA) should be 
performed by DoD assets only when such actions cannot be performed by 
local entities or other federal agencies in a timely manner. Yet if tasked, 
ADA asset use should be efficient, effective, and utilize the least intrusive, 
least costly means to accomplish the support mission within necessary 
timelines. Use of DoD intelligence component capabilities in conjunction 
with aerial reconnaissance may be subject to intelligence oversight for 
intelligence activities (foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
collection), or may be subject to operational parameters and limitation 
specified by the SecDef, if used for a mission other than an intelligence 
activity, such as search and rescue, damage assessment, or incident 
awareness and analysis. (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
This publication is written in a manner that attempts to bridge the jargon of the 
Joint Doctrine with the language of emergency management by framing DSCA 
operations against the NRP, which helps satisfy the NIMS interoperable communication 
requirement. While JP 3-28 goes further than any other strategic publication in aligning 
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military capabilities with national response, it falls short by not lining up the civil support 
operations with the ESFs outlines in the NRF (the current ESFs existed under the NRP).  
F. DSCA AIR SUPPORT HANDBOOK AND THE AFNORTH IAA 
PLAYBOOK 
The Joint Doctrine provides strategic level guidance for the employment of DoD 
forces throughout the spectrum of military operations. While all levels of DoD adhere to 
this doctrine, it is often necessary to expound upon it at the operational and tactical 
levels. In the case of IAA, Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), the Air Component of 
USNORTHCOM, has done just that by developing the Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) Air Support Handbook and the AFNORTH Incident Awareness and 
Assessment Playbook (AFNORTH IAA Playbook). 
The DSCA Air Support Handbook and the AFNORTH IAA Playbook are 
complimentary documents that serve to articulate the relationships and processes that 
pertain to the employment of DoD airborne assets for DSCA missions. The DSCA Air 
Support Handbook provides an overview of the full spectrum of DoD airborne 
capabilities, including IAA, that can assist in consequence management and homeland 
security (Air Forces Northern, 2011, p. 4). 
The AFNORTH IAA Playbook is the current evolution of the AFNORTH IAA 
CONOPS. It details the ISR capabilities that DoD can leverage in support of DSCA 
operations. It gives a brief description of the available systems in the DoD tool kit, 
capabilities and considerations for their employment to include cost per hour. The most 
important thing both the DSCA Air Support Handbook (Air Forces Northern, 2011, pp. 
52–53) and the AFNORTH IAA Playbook bring to the table is a formal definition of IAA 
(Air Forces Northern, 2010, p. 4). 
Incident Awareness and Assessments (IAA) Defined - IAA is similar to 
DoD’s definition of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). 
However, ISR is conducted outside the United States over foreign territory 
or within the United States during Homeland Defense events, while IAA is 
conducted within the United States in support of DSCA operations. The 
change in title is necessary to make it clear that DoD does not collect 
Intelligence on U.S. persons. IAA operations focus on providing timely 
 28
and usable information to all levels of command and to local, State, Civil, 
and Federal leaders in order to save lives, reduce human suffering and 
protect property. The three mission sets of IAA are Broad Area Coverage 
(BAC), Damage Assessment (DA), and Situational Awareness (SA). 
Similar to ISR in the HD mission, IAA capabilities include Electro-
Optical (EO), Infrared (IR), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Multi-
spectral/Hyper-spectral (MSI/HSI), and Full Motion Video (FMV). (Air 
Forces Northern, 2010, p. 4) 
Both of these documents provide a formal definition of IAA and describe IAA 
capabilities in the context of emergency management. The DSCA Air Support Handbook 
specifically discusses ESF #9 Search and Rescue, as DoD is the lead agency for this task 
(Air Forces Northern, 2010, pp. 34–39). It provides a listing of the ESFs, but falls short 
of aligning specific capabilities with applicable ESFs (Air Forces Northern, 2011, p. 94). 
The AFNORTH IAA Playbook does not address the ESFs at all. Both documents are 
conducive to the NIMS interoperable communications concept as they are written in a 
manner that military professionals and interagency partners alike can understand. Unlike 
the Joint Doctrine, these are procedural documents unique to the service that produced 
them and are not considered authoritative across DoD. 
G. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333(AS AMENDED)  
Executive Order 12333 (as amended by Executive Orders 13284, 13355, and 
13470), United States Intelligence Activities, is the President’s intelligence oversight 
directive. It places limitations on the 16 members of the National Intelligence 
Community. DoD comprises a bulk of that membership and is generally prohibited from 
conducting intelligence activities within the United States or conducting intelligence 
activities about a U.S. person or corporation. Some debate exists as to whether or not 
intelligence oversight applies to IAA since it is neither FI nor CI. It does, however, 
involve the use of intelligence resources and personnel and the current legal consensus in 
DoD is to obtain approval from the Secretary of Defense for the use of intelligence 
personnel and assets for the IAA mission. The Joint Doctrine is inconsistent at best at 
addressing these complex legal issues.  
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EO 12333 is implemented within the military by DoD 5240.1R, and supplemental 
regulations within each of the services. Air Force Instruction 14-104, Oversight of 
Intelligence Activities, specifically authorized the use of domestic imagery in support of 
natural disasters. This authorization comes with restrictions including the requirement for 
a Proper Use Memorandum (PUM) to ensure that imagery is used in a responsible 
manner in compliance with applicable law and policy. 
The PUM requires that imagery products be used for specific operational needs 
and do purposefully contain information on U.S. citizens in violation of EO 12333. The 
PUM must also include procedures for mitigating inadvertent collection against persons 
and places in accordance with EO 12333. Compliance with EO 12333 and applicable 
PUMs is vital for legal and ethical reasons, not the least of which is to maintain integrity 
and public trust.  
H. THE POSSE COMITATUS AND THE INSURRECTION ACTS 
The Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18 USC Section 1835, prohibits the Army or the 
Air Force from engaging in law enforcement activities except in instances specifically 
authorized by the Constitution or legislation and provides criminal penalties for doing so. 
Although not specifically enumerated in statute, DoD policy extends this prohibition to 
the Navy and Marines as well.  
The Posse Comitatus Act came into being at the end of the Reconstruction period 
following the War Between the States. Its original purpose was to keep U.S. Marshalls 
from summoning federal troops to supervise elections. Depending on one’s perspective, 
federal troops were being used to intimidate southern voters and keep them from the polls 
to increase votes for Carpetbagger Republicans, or to provide protection for former slaves 
attempting to exercise their newfound rights (Bobbitt, 2009, p. 418). It has evolved to 
mean an almost absolute prohibition against using federal military forces for law 
enforcement.  
While the Posse Comitatus Act is a barrier to IAA, it is not a roadblock. IAA 
could be used to satisfy most situational awareness needs across the homeland security 
spectrum. However, conflicts could arise if IAA platforms were suddenly asked to 
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support law enforcement agencies to apprehend criminals or even in cases where they 
were supporting law enforcement with seemingly benign functions like traffic control. It 
is important to mention that since the Posse Comitatus Act only applies to federal military 
forces, these limitations do not apply to National Guard forces under state control. As an 
example, National Guardsmen under state authorizes routinely fly the RC-26 Metro III 
using the Dragoon sensor pod to provide optical and infrared imaging in support of civil 
law enforcement agencies primarily conducting counter-drug operations (Air Forces 
Northern, 2011, pp. 81–83). 
The Insurrection Act, Title 10 USC, Sections 331-334, provide an exception to the 
Posse Comitatus Act by authorizing the President to use military forces to contain an 
insurrection. The four sections of the act were passed at different times from 1792–1869 
and empower the President to use federal troops or the militia to repress rebellion, 
insurrection, domestic violence or conspiracies that prevent the states from enforcing the 
law (U.S. Congress, 1807). In these cases, there would be no prohibition against utilizing 
federal military forces to conduct IAA in support of law enforcement.  
I. ETHICAL CHALLENGES 
Significant ethical challenges exist when using America’s intelligence apparatus 
domestically. Americans enjoy constitutional protections to privacy, expression and 
freedoms that are as fundamental to our existence as the oxygen we take for granted in 
the air we breathe. Americans value their freedom and loathe ideas that threaten their 
constitutional protections.  
During the 1970s, numerous abuses by the intelligence community became 
known through congressional hearings held by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
Activities, more commonly referred to as the Church Committee after its chairman, Frank 
Church. In 1970, a young man named Christopher Pyle uncovered evidence that the U.S. 
Army had more than 1,500 plain-clothes agents conducting surveillance of anti-war 
rallies during the Vietnam Conflict (Biewen & O’Harrow, 2011). Pyle caught the 
attention of Senator Frank Church who eventually chaired a congressional inquiry.  
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Among the abuses exposed was a program in which the Army compiled intelligence data 
on more than 100,000 Americans who had expressed anti-war sentiments between the 
mid-1960s and 1971 (U.S. Senate, 1976, p. 4). 
The resulting distrust between the public and the intelligence community still 
continues today, which is illustrated by criticism of DoD’s use of a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion 
surveillance aircraft during the Presidential Inauguration in 2009. The P-3 was flying 
with a caged video sensor that was ready to provide full-motion video for consequence 
management in the event that a terrorist attack occurred during the inauguration. An 
article in the Los Angeles Times mentioned that USNORTHCOM was monitoring activity 
on the mall with the P-3 (Meyer, 2009) and Internet blogs quickly filled with 
conspiratorial criticism purporting a range of theories ranging from the military spying on 
Americans to impending martial law. General Gene Renuart, the commander of 
USNORTHCOM at that time, was compelled to clarify the nature and activities of the P-
3 activity. An example of the conspiratorial skepticism still remains posted on the 
USNORTHCOM blog where General Renuart attempted to clarify his position (Renuart, 
2009). 
The Church Committee spawned several key pieces of intelligence reform, most 
notably the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and EO 12333. FISA and EO 
12333 established procedural authorities, safeguards and restrictions on intelligence 
activities, affirms the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) authority as the single 
member of the intelligence community charged with domestic intelligence and generally 
prohibits the other members of the intelligence community from conducting intelligence 
activities against U.S. persons. The exceptions for DoD to conduct IAA with permission 
of the Secretary of Defense as discussed previously in Section G are in place to safeguard 
the rights of Americans. 
While ethical considerations do not make IAA impossible, turning the resources 
of the U.S. intelligence community inward, even with the most altruistic of intentions, 
raises ethical issues and demands a careful and considered approach. EO 12333 and 
DoD’s amplifying guidance provide procedural safeguards to ensure the civil rights of 
Americans but transparency and public assurances are key factors anytime intelligence 
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resources are used to conduct IAA. Although IAA capabilities could significantly 
enhance homeland security law enforcement efforts, any use of DoD IAA capabilities is 
highly restricted and must be carefully considered to comply with law and policy in these 
instances. 
As illustrated above, numerous factors in military doctrine, policy, laws and 
ethical issues exists that are obstacles to using IAA as a homeland security enabler. While 
each area presents challenges to the use of IAA, none is insurmountable. Although 
statutes and executive orders are rigid and exist to safeguard civil liberties, they are 
equipped with exceptions that allow for IAA in the right circumstances. The mere 
acknowledgement that ethical issues exist when using the nation’s intelligence apparatus 
domestically in concert with the statutory and policy safeguards in place make it unlikely 
that military commanders would use IAA assets unscrupulously or for illegal purposes. 
This renders the ethical issues largely matters of perception that can be mitigated if not 
managed through a good public affairs program. This leaves the Joint Doctrine as the 
remaining impediment and illustrates that existing military doctrine for warfighting is not 
easily mated with the NRF and needs of emergency managers when DoD is asked to step 
up in the homeland security arena. By focusing on the gaps between military doctrine and 
the NRF, meaningful solutions may be identified that simplify the ability of DoD to 
provide IAA capabilities to the interagency and increase the efficiency of emergency 
response. 
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
While IAA has the potential to increase the effectiveness of homeland security 
and defense, many obstacles impede using DoD intelligence personnel and equipment 
within the United States, even with benign intent when these activities are undertaken to 
further the interests of national security for the greater good. These obstacles present 
themselves in the form of doctrine, policy, laws and ethics. A thorough analysis of these 
obstacles in Chapter III showed that the legal and policy obstacles are essentially 
constraints that the legislative and executive branches have put in place to avoid or 
mitigate the ethical problems surrounding the use of federal military forces and the 
national intelligence community on U.S. soil. As the analysis indicates, the most 
significant impediments actually consist of bringing the DoD doctrine into alignment 
with the emergency management community through the NRF. This chapter narrows the 
focus to the examination of the Joint Doctrine and the NRF using specific criteria 
identified as necessary for the successful employment of IAA in the previous chapter. 
These criteria are the commonalities found through the analysis conducted in Chapter III 
that represent essential policy elements required for the successful employment of IAA in 
support of homeland security.  
B. CRITERIA FOR MEASURES OF IAA EFFECTIVENESS 
These specific criteria include the following. 
• Authoritativeness  
• Acceptance 
• Ease of understanding 
• Compatibility 
• Fosters unity of effort 
• Complies with federal law 
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• Complies with EO 12333 (as amended) 
• Contains safeguards to mitigate ethical issues 
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: JOINT PUBLICATION 2-0: JOINT 
INTELLIGENCE 
Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence (JP 2-0) is part of the Joint Doctrine and 
is, therefore, considered authoritative and accepted throughout DoD. Since JP 2-0 does 
not list IAA as a doctrinal mission set and JP 2-0 is accepted as authoritative guidance for 
incorporating intelligence into military operations, IAA is not widely recognized or 
accepted in DoD. JP 2-0 is written in military-speak so DoD’s intelligence processes may 
not be easily understood by stakeholders outside the military, like those in the emergency 
management professions. The Joint Doctrine as a whole prefers to work under the 
auspices of unity of command but recognizes that in some instances unity of command 
may not be achievable and that unity of effort is essential in those cases. It addresses 
unity of effort through the concept of the JCMB, which is an ad hoc board consisting of 
representatives from the different service components prioritizing their collection 
requirements in support of the targeting cycle used to destroy an enemy and its capability 
to make war. However, JCMB members all work for a single unified commander so the 
unity of effort problem is really solved through unity of command (Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. I-11). This is somewhat impractical in a homeland security’s 
interagency environment. Since JP 2-0 is primarily focused on kinetic military operations 
and does not address IAA, it skirts the legal issues, executive orders and the ethical 
requirements associated with IAA. 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0: JOINT 
OPERATIONS 
Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (JP 3-0) is the keystone of the Joint 
Doctrine and is, therefore, considered authoritative and accepted throughout the DoD. JP 
3-0 does not recognize the IAA mission set and since IAA only exists in the tactics, 
techniques and procedures of the service components (i.e., Air Forces Northern and U.S. 
Army North) that support USNORTHCOM in the form of concepts of operations, the 
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DSCA Air Support Handbook and the AFNORTH IAA Playbook, IAA is not widely 
accepted throughout DoD. JP 3-0 is steeped with acronyms and the military vernacular, 
so DoD’s operational processes may not be easily understood by stakeholders outside the 
military like those in the emergency management professions. JP 3-0 places a priority on 
unity of command but recognizes that commanders may have to settle for unity of effort 
in some cases. It does not, however, make any substantive recommendations for 
achieving unity of effort. JP 3-0 is primarily focused on kinetic operations and does not 
address IAA or the legal issues, executive orders and ethical issues surrounding it. 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: JOINT PUBLICATION 3-28: CIVIL 
SUPPORT 
Joint Publication 3-28: Civil Support (JP 3-28) is also part of the Joint Doctrine, 
and therefore, considered authoritative. More than any of the other joint publications, it is 
written to complement the emergency management community. However, JP 3-28 falls 
short because it was written to complement the NRP, which was superseded by the NRF 
within days of its publication. JP 3-28 does recognize that while supporting civil 
authorities in the homeland security environment, DoD must operate in support of a lead 
federal agency and should concentrate on achieving unity of effort. It falls short of 
codifying IAA as a formal mission set, but does broach the possibility under the auspices 
of aerial damage assessment. It recognizes the issues surrounding the Posse Comitatus 
Act and the Insurrection Act, as well as EO 12333. There are, however, some 
discrepancies regarding the need for intelligence oversight in compliance with EO 12333 
as expressed in DoD 5240.1R, AFI 14-104, and the AFNORTH IAA Playbook. JP 3-28 
takes the position that intelligence oversight may not be applicable to what it terms aerial 
damage assessment, as it is neither FI nor CI. This position may actually increase the risk 
of creating ethical issues and seems to be at odds with DoD regulatory guidance 
concerning EO 12333. JP 3-28 comes closest of all the joint publications to recognizing 
IAA as a formal DoD mission set but does not incorporate the tactics, techniques and 
procedures developed within USNORTHCOM’s service components. 
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F. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: DSCA AIR SUPPORT HANDBOOK 
Air Forces Northern, the air component of USNORTHCOM, wrote the 
AFNORTH DSCA Air Support Handbook as a reference guide for the USAF Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers to use in their roles as advisors to the emergency 
management functions in the states and territories. As such, it is designed to be 
compatible with the NRF. It is a concept of operations document falling under the 
category of tactics, techniques and procedures, developed at the operational level and is 
not yet incorporated in the Joint Doctrine. As such, it is not considered authoritative 
within the DoD. This presents particular problems whenever USNORTHOM is required 
to support civil authorities. Combatant Commanders generally do not have all of the 
forces assigned that are required to execute their missions during a contingency. For 
example, Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) had no standing 
forces prior to the first Gulf War and only a handful of standing forces when hostilities 
began in Afghanistan and Iraq. USCENTCOM relies on forces provided by the Joint 
Staff through the Global Force Management Process to conduct operations. Similarly, 
Commander USNORTHCOM has no standing forces. When USNORTHCOM is given a 
mission, it must obtain forces through the Joint Staff using the Global Force Management 
Process. Since IAA is not recognized in the Joint Doctrine, each time an asset is required 
to support an IAA mission, USNORTHCOM and its component commands must provide 
a customized proposal including justification of the requirement for ISR resources and 
compete with other doctrinal ISR mission resource requirements. Without IAA being 
recognized in doctrine, building a plan and justifying resources to conduct IAA each time 
a Katrina, California Wildfires, or Deepwater Horizon occurs is analogous to building a 
custom Ferrari each time one wishes to drive to the grocery store. This document also 
recognizes DoD’s role in interagency relationships and is written with unity of effort as 
opposed to unity of command in mind. The DSCA Air Support Handbook does recognize 
that IAA has special requirements and offers strategies to comply with the Posse 
Comitatus Act, the Insurrection Act and EO 12333. In doing so, it attempts to mitigate 
ethical issues that may arise when conducting IAA missions. 
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G. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: AFNORTH IAA PLAYBOOK 
The AFNORTH IAA Playbook provides the most succinct information in DoD on 
conducting IAA. Like the DSCA Air Support Handbook, it is written at the service level 
and has not been adopted into the Joint Doctrine. As such, it is not considered 
authoritative throughout DoD, which causes the same challenges outlined above when 
USNORTHCOM and its components attempt to secure ISR resources for IAA missions 
through the Global Force Management Process. Since IAA has not been adopted into the 
Joint Doctrine, a customized solution must be proffered to the Joint Staff each time an 
event or disaster of national significance occurs. The IAA Playbook is not aligned with 
the NRF but is written with the ease of understanding for interagency partners in mind. In 
the same thread, it recognized the interagency nature of DSCA and IAA operations and 
takes the unity of effort approach over unity of command. The AFNORTH IAA Playbook 
offers considerations for conducting IAA within the legal constraints posed by the Posse 
Comitatus Act, the Insurrection Act and EO 12333. It also discusses the need for a PUM 
for handling domestic imagery, which offers ethical safeguards against improper 
collection against U.S. persons. 
H. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: THE NATIONAL RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK 
The NRF does not recognize IAA as a mission. The NIMS recognizes the need 
for information and intelligence as an enabler for conducting emergency management 
operations but does not realistically envision IAA. The NRF outlines specific tasks 
through the 15 ESFs that generate information and situational awareness requirements, 
but does not offer methodologies to answer these requirements. The NRF is authoritative 
in that it provides a framework for state, local and tribal governments to interface with 
the federal government, yet it is not directive in nature. It is essentially a blueprint for 
interagency cooperation, and as such, is accepted through consensus by interagency 
partners. The NRF is written in plain language for ease of understanding by stakeholders, 
and as such, is compatible with all homeland security disciplines. As a framework, the 
NRF is designed to allow interagency partners to operate within their given legal 
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authorities and assumes a coordinated federal response with a lead federal agency in 
charge being supported by DoD. Therefore, it is compliant with federal laws since it does 
not address IAA or using the DoD intelligence assets, the Posse Comitatus Act, the 
Insurrection Act, EO 12333 and the surrounding ethical issues are not especially 
applicable. 
I. COMPARISON OF POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
A side-by-side comparison of these policy and doctrine documents using the 
criteria specified above as measures of effectiveness illustrates the policy gaps with 
respect to IAA.  
Table 2.   Comparison of IAA Policies and Doctrine Against IAA Measures of 
Effectiveness 




Mission Set    X X  
Authoritative X X X   X 
Accepted X X X    
Easy to 
Understand    X X X 
Compatible    X  X 
Unity of Effort   X X X X 
Compliant with 
Federal Laws X* X* X X X X 
Compliant with 
EO 12333 X* X*   X  
Contains Ethical 
Safeguards     X  
*These publications are compliant with federal laws and EO 12333 because they primarily address overseas operations. They do not 
address the use of intelligence assets and personnel for domestic operations. 
Since the joint publications are geared toward warfighting, they are particularly 
lacking when it comes to interagency cooperation and compliance with federal laws, 
executive orders and ethical safeguards necessary for IAA. As the framework for national 
emergency response, the NRF is accepted as a consensus policy for interagency 
cooperation. While it outlines specified and implied information requirements through  
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the 15 ESFs, it does not offer methodologies for satisfying these requirements. The DSCA 
Air Support Handbook and AFNORTH IAA Playbook attempt to bridge the gaps between 
the Joint Doctrine and the NRF but neither are authoritative.  
Now that these gaps and seams in policy and doctrine have been identified, they 
can be used to formulate recommendations that can potentially increase the effectiveness 
of IAA delivery and employment for homeland security and defense. The next chapter 
examines recommendations for bridging these policy gaps. 
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING IAA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have served to identify doctrinal, policy, legal and ethical 
challenges that pose obstacles to the use of DoD ISR capabilities as an enabler for 
homeland security. Careful analysis of these obstacles illustrates that federal law, EO 
12333 and ethical challenges are not insurmountable and essentially define constraints 
within which federal military forces and members of the national intelligence community 
must operate domestically to safeguard the rights of Americans.  
The primary obstacles have been shown to lie in the disconnect between military 
doctrine and emergency management policy. The Joint Doctrine is geared toward 
fighting wars and creating kinetic effects on the battlefield. The NRF fails to recognize 
the spectrum of capabilities, to include IAA, which air power can bring to bear on 
problems, and in doing, so favors a two-dimensional approach to managing emergencies. 
While heading the Deepwater Horizon response, Admiral Thad Allen lamented this fact 
in a newspaper interview when he stated, “we needed to manage the situation as a three-
dimensional battle space…. I got up at four the next morning and wrote an e-mail 
explaining to everyone that we were going to move away from a traditional spill response 
and go to 3-D battle management.” He claimed that recognizing this and moving toward 
a 3-D strategy was the pivotal point that turned the tide in the oil spill response 
(Robinson, 2010). 
Bearing these facts in mind, several recommendations are set forth below that 
should be considered for incorporation into the Joint Doctrine and the NRF. These 
recommendations should improve the ability of USNORTHCOM to provide IAA in 
support of homeland security and improve the ability of the emergency management 
community to take advantage of the capabilities that IAA brings to the task of saving 
lives and mitigating threats to the homeland. DoD will always face legal and cultural 
restraints when operating in the domestic environment and these recommendations are  
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not magical solutions that will instantly eliminate these challenges. Instead, these 
recommendations are the first steps in the long journey of incorporating DoD ISR 
capabilities into the homeland security enterprise toolbox. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JOINT DOCTRINE 
As mentioned earlier, the Joint Doctrine is the authoritative DoD guidance for 
planning and executing joint operations. To formalize IAA as a mission set recognized by 
DoD in its entirety, it must be codified into the Joint Doctrine. The best way to do this is 
to incorporate the definition of IAA into the pertinent joint publications. 
1. Joint Publication 2-0 
Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence is the authoritative portion of the Joint 
Doctrine that outlines how DoD conducts intelligence. The analysis in Chapter IV 
identified several areas in which Joint Publication 2-0 could be improved that would 
facilitate the use of IAA for homeland security. As currently written, this document does 
not recognize IAA as a DoD mission and does not address it. Although IAA is considered 
neither FI nor CI, it is conducted using intelligence assets and personnel, and therefore, is 
not inappropriate to address in this document. Since it does not currently address IAA, it 
does not address the legal and ethical issues surrounding IAA. 
The recommended course of action is to incorporate IAA, as defined in the 
AFNORTH IAA Playbook, into Joint Publication 2-0. Since this publication is specific to 
the conduct of joint intelligence operations, it should include a comprehensive overview 
of IAA and the issues surrounding the use of ISR for domestic support. This should 
include a discussion of the situational awareness and information requirements from the 
NRF that IAA can potentially satisfy along with a discussion of the necessity of 
achieving unity of effort in the interagency environment. It should also include a 
discussion of the current policy view that IAA is neither FI nor CI but uses intelligence 
resources, and therefore, requires specific authorities from the Secretary of Defense prior 
to execution. A discussion of the ethical safeguards, such as legal reviews and proper use 
memoranda, should be included.  
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In doing so, Joint Publication 2-0 would offer authoritative IAA guidance to the 
DoD at large. It would also address the legal issues surrounding IAA and offer guidance 
on the ethical safeguards required to conduct this type of mission. This would be 
accomplished through inputs from USNORTHCOM to the existing joint publication 
rewrite cycle in which combatant commands make recommended changes to the Joint 
Doctrine. 
2. Joint Publication 3-0 
Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations is the keystone publication for the Joint 
Doctrine in its entirety. It is the authoritative portion of the Joint Doctrine that addresses 
the full spectrum of joint operations and is accepted as definitive guidance on the subject. 
As currently written, Joint Publication 3-0 does not address IAA or recognize it as a DoD 
mission. This presents particular challenges for USNORTHCOM when tasked to conduct 
IAA for DSCA. Since this keystone document does recognize IAA, it does not address 
the legal and ethical issues surrounding IAA. 
The recommended course of action is to incorporate IAA, as defined in the 
AFNORTH IAA Playbook, into this document. Since Joint Publication 3-0 is the keystone 
of the Joint Doctrine, this is vital to formalizing IAA successfully as a DoD mission set. 
As this publication is operational rather than intelligence specific, a brief overview of the 
IAA mission, capabilities and considerations, including a reminder that Secretary of 
Defense approval is required prior to execution, should be sufficient depth for the 
intended audience of this document. 
By incorporating these changes into Joint Publication 3-0, IAA would finally 
become a formalized DoD mission. Since this publication is the keystone, modifications 
to other relevant publications would be easier because the remainder of the Joint 
Doctrine supplements Joint Publication 3-0, which would be accomplished through 
inputs from USNORTHCOM to the existing joint publication rewrite cycle in which 
combatant commands make recommended changes to the Joint Doctrine. 
 44
3. Joint Publication 3-28 
If Joint Publication 3-0 is the keystone of the Joint Doctrine, then Joint 
Publication 3-28: Civil Support is the cornerstone of the Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities mission. It is considered DoD’s authoritative guidance for civil support 
operations. Analysis of this publication revealed it to be dated because it was written to 
complement the NRP, which has been superseded by the NRF. Joint Publication 3-28 
comes as close to any authoritative doctrinal document to recognizing IAA, but does not 
quite get there. It gives a nod to using ISR for what it terms Aerial Damage Assessment. 
It also attempts to address the legal, policy and ethical issues surrounding the use of 
federal forces and ISR domestically; however, it provides conflicting guidance with 
respect to intelligence oversight and EO 12333. 
The recommended course of action for this document is to incorporate IAA and 
include comprehensive information pertaining to IAA and surrounding issues. It should 
be revised and updated to maximize compatibility with the NRF. By aligning DoD 
mission capabilities with the ESFs found in the NRF, both compatibility between DoD 
and the emergency response community may be achieved, which would result in a DoD 
doctrinal publication written in something resembling plain English rather than military 
jargon and would be both authoritative and accepted. The IAA definition from the 
AFNORTH IAA Playbook should be incorporated into this publication along with a 
comprehensive discussion of the ESFs and associated situational awareness and 
information requirements (outlined in the NRF under the scope of each ESF) that may be 
satisfied through IAA. This should also include a comprehensive discussion of the special 
authorities required from the Secretary of Defense, as well as a clarification of the 
intelligence oversight and ethical safeguards requirements, such as legal reviews and 
proper use memoranda needed to conduct IAA effectively. Ideally, Joint Publication 3-
28 would compliment a stand-alone emergency support function (notionally ESF #16) for 
IAA. If an ideal ESF #16 existed, DHS would most likely be designated as the lead 
agency with DoD designated in as a supporting role. Joint Publication 2-0 uses the 
JCMB concept to ensure both unity of command and unity of effort with respect to 
intelligence collection. The IRSCC within the Intelligence and Analysis Branch of DHS 
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is a multiagency, ad hoc organization chartered to assist in coordinating remote sensing 
efforts for the interagency during homeland security events (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009, p. 45). The IRSCC could serve the function of an Interagency Joint 
Collection Management Board. In the case of the interagency, little probability exists of 
achieving unity of command, but the IRSCC could become the mechanism used to obtain 
unity of effort for IAA. 
Formalizing IAA in Joint Publication 3-28 and aligning it with the NRF has the 
potential to make IAA work better. Incorporating a comprehensive overview of IAA and 
its surrounding issues can help to overcome the obstacles that impede the effective use of 
ISR for homeland security, which would be accomplished through inputs from 
USNORTHCOM to the existing joint publication rewrite cycle in which combatant 
commands make recommended changes to the Joint Doctrine. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NRF 
The NRF is the Rosetta Stone for emergency response. It is the common language 
that emergency managers and first responders use to conduct consequence management. 
Analysis of the NRF revealed that while  the NIMS recognizes the need for information 
and intelligence to enable effective response operations, no provision is made for it in the 
emergency support functions. Additionally, Admiral Thad Allen articulated frustration at 
the existing national emergency response policies while serving as the national incident 
commander for Deepwater Horizon. He suggested that an ESF for IAA could have made 
for a more effective response and that the possibility of incorporating such an ESF into 
the NRF should be investigated (Dean, 2010). 
The recommended course of action for the NRF is to add ESF #16, Incident 
Awareness and Assessment. The scope of ESF #16 should include remote sensing, broad 
area coverage, damage assessment and situational awareness. It should capture the idea of 
IAA capabilities used to rapidly survey and assess affected areas and allow emergency 
managers to make rapid, informed decisions in the aftermath of an event or disaster. DHS 
should be designated as the lead agency for ESF# 16 with the IRSCC serving as the  
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Interagency JCMB. The IRSCC should serve as the focal point for unity of effort and 
consensus to manage the overall IAA effort, coordinate resources and ensure unity of 
effort. 
By implementing this recommendation, the NRF would offer a three-dimensional 
response using IAA to facilitate the efforts of emergency managers and first responders 
alike, which would potentially allow incident commanders to direct scarce resources with 
increased speed and effectiveness. These changes would be implemented by coordination 
through USNORTHCOM to the interagency, specifically to DHS and FEMA. It is 
recommended that an endorsement from Admiral Allen be included while Deepwater 
Horizon is still fresh in the corporate memory of the emergency response and homeland 
security community. This will require buy-in from stakeholders within DHS and the 
IRSCC. 
D. COMPARISON OF CURRENT AND PROPOSED POLICIES 
By conducting a side-by-side comparison of the current doctrine and policies with 
the proposed changes to those policies against the measures of effectiveness outlined in 
Chapter IV, it becomes clear that these recommended changes have the potential to 
advance the effectiveness of using IAA for homeland security and defense. As can be 
seen, Join Publication 3-28 becomes, as it rightly should be, the bridge between the Joint 
Doctrine and the NRF. The recommended changes to Joint Publications 2-0 and 3-0 
serve to buttress Joint Publication 3-28 with respect to IAA. The addition of ESF #16, 
Incident Awareness and Assessment, in the NRF formalizes the role of IAA in 
emergency management and makes the military and emergency management 
communities more compatible. Additionally, designating DHS as the lead federal agency 
responsible for ESF #16 and designating the IRSCC as the Interagency JCMB, should 





Table 3.   Comparison of Current and Proposed IAA Policies and Doctrine Against 
IAA Measures of Effectiveness 
 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 3-28 DSCA Handbook 
IAA 
Playbook NRF 




 X  X  X X X  X 
Authoritative X X X X X X   X X 
Accepted X X X X X X     
Easy to 
Understand      X X X X X 
Compatible  X    X X  X X 
Unity of 












 X    X  X   
*These publications are compliant with federal laws and EO 12333 because they primarily address overseas operations. They do not 
address the use of intelligence assets and personnel for domestic operations. C –Current, P–Proposed. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Using DoD ISR in support of homeland security and defense encompasses many 
complex issues. While these recommendations may not solve every issue surrounding 
IAA, implementing these simple policy changes could go a long way to formalizing the 
IAA mission facilitating recognition and acceptance beyond USNORTHCOM, 
throughout DoD. This could prove very advantageous for USNORTHCOM when 
competing for resources with other warfighting commanders in the Global Force 
Management Process and streamline the IAA process and, thus, alleviating the need to 
design a custom solution each time a disaster or homeland security event occurs that 
requires military support. Additionally, increasing the compatibility of the Joint Doctrine 
and the NRF should increase the effectiveness of the DSCA response and IAA as a 
whole.  
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The next chapter summarizes the potential contribution that IAA can make to 
homeland security and defense, the challenges and obstacles that impinge upon 
USNORTHCOM’s ability to deliver IAA capabilities to the interagency, and policy 
recommendations that may help overcome these problems. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Since its inception, USNORTHCOM has been responsible for providing DoD 
support to the civil authorities of the United States when asked and legally authorized to 
do so. Generally speaking, this support occurs when a disaster or homeland security event 
occurs of such scale and proportion that it exceeds the capabilities of federal, state and 
local civil authorities. Hurricane Katrina was such an occurrence, and represents the 
watershed homeland security event that changed the way the emergency management and 
homeland security communities think and operate.  
One capability that DoD brings to any operation is ISR. This generally consists of 
flying both manned and unmanned sensor platforms above the battle space to develop a 
clear picture of the situation. In wartime, this picture would include the disposition of 
enemy forces, as well as the locations of roads, bridges and infrastructure and specific 
information required to target the enemy. In other words, ISR provides a high level of 
situational awareness that can be used strategically to obtain the big picture and tactically 
to obtain the intelligence necessary to engage individual targets. The situational 
awareness that ISR provides is a significant force multiplier on which military 
commanders have come to rely for the full spectrum of operations.  
DoD ISR capabilities have the potential to be a force multiplier in the homeland 
security arena as well. USNORTHCOM has coined the term IAA to denote the use of 
ISR when used domestically to support homeland security. Notably, IAA has been used 
in events, such as Hurricane Katrina, the California Wildfires of 2007, the earthquake in 
Haiti and most recently, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. IAA has the potential to provide 
incident commanders and first responders alike with vastly improved situational 
awareness. Having the big picture can allow incident commanders to make rapid 
decisions regarding where and how to apply precious resources to a large-scale problem. 




area they are about to enter. However, significant obstacles exist that impede the ability 
of DoD to use intelligence assets and personnel for domestic operations. These 
impediments consist primarily of policy, legal and ethical barriers.  
Policy barriers within DoD and the emergency management community present 
the most tangible obstacles to the use of ISR in support of homeland security. Within 
DoD, the Joint Doctrine is the strategic-level, authoritative guidance used by the military 
services to conduct full spectrum operations. The preponderance of the Joint Doctrine, 
particularly the portions dedicated to operations and intelligence, are focused on 
warfighting. The single Joint Staff doctrinal publication (JP 3-28) dedicated to supporting 
civil authorities is somewhat dated. IAA concepts of operations, tactics, techniques and 
procedures have matured at the operational level but have yet to be incorporated into 
relevant joint doctrine. Since these operational level policies are not considered 
authoritative and have not been incorporated into the Joint Doctrine, IAA is not accepted 
throughout DoD as a defined mission set.  
The NRF is accepted and used as the overarching guidance by federal, state, local 
and tribal stakeholders to conduct emergency responses. The NRF contains 15 ESFs, 
each of which contains specified informational requirements, many of which can 
potentially be fulfilled using IAA. The NRF is essentially two-dimensional in its 
approach to emergency management. It does not recognize the value of leveraging 
remote sensing operations, such as IAA, to provide critical information for rapid 
assessment and understanding. Additionally, DoD doctrine is centered on warfighting. 
When DoD is tasked with supporting civil authorities, warfighting doctrine and the NRF 
are not compatible. They are figuratively a square peg and a round hole. 
EO 12333 (as amended), Conduct of Intelligence Activities constitutes another 
policy barrier to the conduct of IAA. EO 12333 places limitations on members of the 
national intelligence community with respect to domestic activities and U.S. persons. EO 
12333 places a general prohibition on DoD intelligence components against collecting 




exceptions. With respect to IAA, these prohibitions are not insurmountable. Current legal 
opinions indicate that IAA does not constitute FI or CI and may be conducted within the 
constraints of EO 12333 with approval of the Secretary of Defense. 
Legal barriers also exist to the conduct of IAA. The Posse Comitatus Act and the 
Insurrection Act, like EO 12333, serve to constrain the activities of federal military forces 
in the domestic arena. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the services from acting in a 
law enforcement capacity. Federal forces must take care to ensure that IAA is not 
conducted in a manner in which federal military forces could be construed or appear to be 
acting as an agent of law enforcement unless the criteria exists for the President to invoke 
the Insurrection Act. Like EO 12333, careful analysis of these federal laws shows these 
barriers are not insurmountable. 
Finally, ethical barriers serve as impediments to the conduct of IAA in support of 
homeland security. These ethical issues became known in the early 1970s because of 
allegations that national intelligence agencies were acting in a manner inconsistent with 
America’s constitutional values. These allegations were brought to light through Senate 
Hearings known as the Church Commission. Among the abuses revealed was evidence 
that the military was collecting intelligence on thousands of American citizens who held 
anti-war views. The backlash from these revelations resulted in restrictive policies like 
EO 12333 and created an air of public distrust that lingers today, which was evidenced as 
recently as the last presidential inauguration when accusations that Navy surveillance 
aircraft were spying on inaugural participants. However, careful analysis supports the 
conclusion that ethical concerns can be mitigated by the constraints imposed by law, EO 
12333, and a considered approach prior to execution. 
With these factors in mind, the areas that present the greatest challenges are found 
in policy. Specifically the current state of DoD’s Joint Doctrine and the NRF need to be 
modified. IAA should be defined as an accepted DoD mission set by adding it to key 
publications relevant to conducting IAA. Specifically, it should be codified in Joint 
Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations and Joint 
Publication 3-28: Civil Support.  
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IAA should also be incorporated into the NRF as a separate emergency support 
function with DHS as the lead federal agency, through the Interagency Remote Sensing 
and Coordination Cell (IRSCC), to bring the three-dimensional approach to emergency 
response. DoD uses a JCMB concept to manage ISR priorities and ensure unity of effort 
and command. The Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination Center should serve as an 
Interagency JCMB that guarantees unity of effort for the IAA process.  
Many challenges face the use of the military in domestic operations. Even more 
challenges arise when elements of the national intelligence community are used 
domestically. There is, however, great potential to increase the effectiveness of homeland 
security and emergency response by leveraging DoD ISR capabilities for IAA. While the 
policy recommendations in this thesis do not purport to solve all of the complex issues 
surrounding the use of IAA in homeland security, implementing these fundamental policy 
changes represent significant strides toward overcoming internal obstacles within DoD 
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